'decade of denationalization' (Bofinger 2008) , collective bargaining in the public sector became increasingly difficult and more fragmented. It seems that after a brief pause staff reductions will continue in the years to come. In 2009, the so-called 'debt brake', which limits public debt, was enshrined in the constitution. Future German governments will only have a choice between tax increases or cuts in public expenditure. The German 'debt brake' is becoming the model for all Eurozone countries, which makes careful analysis of its possible consequences even more important.
Because of the good economic and employment performance, no special adjustment programmes for the public service in and after the financial crisis could be economically or politically justified. Therefore to understand adjustments in public sector employment our analysis has to cover a longer period starting in the 1990s and looking forward to the impact of the debt brake and the future budget plans of the Ministry of Finance.
This chapter begins with an analysis of macroeconomic indicators of public finance, which are compared with those in other EU member states (Section 2). The structure and development of public sector employment are then investigated (Section 3). This is followed by an examination of industrial relations and collective bargaining (Section 4) and a comparison of pay levels in the private and public sectors (Section 5). In Section 6, two case studies are presented. In the first, the new prevailing wage laws for public procurement, recently introduced by some Länder governments in order to reduce wage competition in public tendering, are outlined. In the second, local adjustment programmes in highly indebted municipalitiestaking the example of Duisburg -that have lost their budget autonomy and ceded control to the Regierungsbezirk (the primary administrative division of a Land or federal state) and its chief administrative officer (Regierungspräsident) are analysed. The final section concludes.
THE 'DECADE OF DENATIONALIZATION' -PUBLIC FINANCE IN GERMANY
In order better to understand the extent to which the state in Germany has shrunk, it is helpful to examine the evolution of government expenditure in the years before the financial crisis, after which such expenditure was boosted by stimulus packages and increased spending on labour market policy, especially short-time working. Between 1999 and 2007, nominal total government expenditure in Germany increased only slightly and real total government expenditure actually fell (Table 6 .1). In all other EU countries and the United States, government expenditures grew in real terms and contributed to economic growth. The main reasons for this uniquely German development were major tax cuts. The tax reforms introduced by the Red-Green coalition in the early 2000s had the greatest impact. Among the many changes, particular mention should be made of the lowering of the marginal rate of income tax from 51 to 42 per cent and of corporate tax from 25 to 20 per cent. In 1995 the wealth tax was declared unlawful by the Federal Court because of its unequal treatment of different forms of wealth (houses, land, shares, cash deposits) and has not been reintroduced since then. These tax reforms, and not the negative impact of the economic crisis of 2003-05 on the government budget, were the reason why Germany did not meet the Maastricht criteria between 2002 and 2005. The Maastricht criteria were incorporated into the 1992 Treaty on European Union, which led to the introduction of the euro, mainly because of pressure from Germany. The biggest ever increase in VAT, from 16 to 19 per cent, introduced in 2007 could not compensate for the revenue lost to the earlier tax cuts. If the tax laws had remained as they were in 1998, government revenues would have been €51 billion greater in 2011, which equates to 2.1 per cent of GDP and 9 per cent of annual tax revenues (Truger 2011: 20) . These unsustainable tax cuts increased public debt and were used to justify expenditure cuts to bring the debt rate down. Through severe budget control, the government reduced the annual budget deficit from -3. The substantial impact of this austerity policy on employment and public sector pay will be analysed in detail later in this chapter. Here it should be mentioned that the public investment rate, which as early as the 1990s was already below the average level in the Eurozone, declined even further. The investment gap compared to the Eurozone average widened and net investment actually became negative (Figure 6.1) . This policy of public disinvestment, together with a rigorous policy of wage moderation, damped down domestic demand and made the German economy completely dependent on export growth. The underinvestment in education and infrastructure might weaken economic growth in the long term. France, Spain and the Eurozone, 1995-2010 In 2009 Germany amended its constitution to incorporate a debt brake that requires the federal government to eliminate its structural deficit by 2016. New structural debt is to be capped at 0.35 per cent of GDP after a transitional period that ends in 2016. Exceptions can be made in the event of specific emergencies that are beyond the government's control and place a great strain on its budgets. Additional borrowing will only be possible if the economy is weak. The structural target allows deficits to rise when output falls below its potential. These deficits should then be offset with surpluses during upswings.
Figure 6.1 Net state investment as a percentage of GDP, Germany in comparison to
The basic idea is that upswings and downswings follow symmetrical trajectories, which they mostly do not. The brake mechanism is not as automatic as it seems. The structural deficit has to be calculated by estimating the elasticity of government spending and revenues, that is, how much expenditure and tax revenues fluctuate over the economic cycle. Moreover, it must be ascertained whether the economy is in an upswing or a downswing. This is done by calculating the difference between actual and potential GDP -both of which are frequently revised. Model calculations have shown that, depending on the scenario used, consolidation requirements for the federal government may vary between €27.6 and €43.5 billion in 2016 (Jaecker 2010) .
Moreover as from 2020, the Länder governments will no longer be allowed to run structural fiscal deficits at all. The losses caused by the tax cuts reduced the revenues of the Länder by about €25 billion, which equates approximately to their accumulated budget deficits. Transitional assistance totalling €800 million per year is planned for the particularly highly indebted states of Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. In return, these five states must steadily reduce their structural deficits from their 2010 levels. The other states must aim to comply with the new provisions from 2020 onwards (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011: 18) . Distinguishing between 'structural' and 'cyclical' deficits and operationalizing specific emergencies are as difficult for the Länder as for the federal government. The debt breaks the golden rule of public finance, namely that investments with future returns can be financed by loans, and reduces incentives for public investments. Instead, it creates incentives for the short-term consolidation of public budgets by privatization or sale-and-lease-back operations, which help to shift expenditures into the future. Since most of the Länder expenditures are used to pay employees in basic services such as the police, schools and universities, budget consolidation seems to be impossible without major cutbacks in basic services unless taxes are increased.
EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Level of Employment
The public sector comprises the direct and the indirect public service. The direct public service includes employees of the federal state, the Länder, the municipalities and joint municipal authorities (for waste disposal, water supply and so on). The indirect public service includes institutions under public law, such as the central bank, the social insurance funds and the employment offices. Some statistics include the number of employees in enterprises under private law but under public control (more than 50 per cent of shares owned by the state).
The public service is rather decentralized. In 2009, the federal state spent only 19.2 per cent of all public expenditures compared to 45.8 per cent in the OECD31 (OECD 2011b). Part of the federal state's revenues is redistributed, mainly to the social insurance funds and, via the Länder, to the municipalities. Most labour-intensive services are assigned by the constitution to the Länder and the municipalities, which explains their high shares in public sector employment. Table 6 .2 shows that the number of employees in the public sector went In 2010, about 1 million employees were working in private companies under public control. Most of them, such as employees of the German Post, Telecom, Railways and hospitals, had belonged in the past to the public service. The shift from the direct to the indirect public service signifies a restructuring of the public service itself, with many activities being concentrated in institutions under private law. The reduction in public sector employment mainly took place in the 1990s, when many public utilities were privatized. Since the early 2000s, the rate of reduction has slowed down but the decline continues as a result of privatizations, mainly in the health sector, recruitment bans and early retirement schemes in the direct public sector. Just before the financial crisis and up to 2010, public sector employment started to grow slowly again.
A more detailed analysis of the impact of privatization and outsourcing shows that a staff reduction of about 11 per cent since 1991 can be attributed to rationalization strategies intended to make the public sector leaner (Vesper 2012: 13) . The overwhelming share is the result of outsourcing and privatization, whose impact on the German public service has been greater than on average in the OECD as a whole. The share of the total production costs of government-produced and -funded goods and services in GDP is below the average for OECD33. In addition, the private sector is more heavily involved than on average in the OECD33 in producing public services and goods. The private sector's share grew between 2000 and 2009, due mainly to payments for health services. Since gross and net investment declined, it is not surprising that fixed capital costs are also below the OECD33 average (Figure 6.2) . Consequently, the share in total government expenditure of expenditure on employee compensation (OECD 2011a) and the share of government employment in the total labour force are below the levels of most other OECD countries ( Figure  6 .3). 1 Germany has a long tradition of employing civil servants, not only in core government functions, such as government ministries, public administration, the armed services and the police force but also in education and the social insurance funds. Even most employees in public enterprises, such as post offices and public transport, were employed as civil servants. Most civil servants have lifelong employment and cannot be dismissed. 2 principle, because the cuts were not necessarily fully compensated for by performance bonuses, and thus an adequate living standard was no longer guaranteed. Most of the burden of job cuts since 1991 has been borne by non-civil servants, whose number went down from 4.6 million in 1991 to 2.7 million in 2009. The number of civil servants (including military personnel) fell only slightly, from 2.1 million in 1991 to 1.85 million in 2010 (Destatis 2011a: 100) . The reason for this decrease in the number of civil servants was mainly the privatization of public utilities. The federal state, the Länder and the municipalities actually increased the number of civil servants in their employment because they are cheaper in the short run and working and employment conditions, such as pay cuts and increases in working hours can be decided unilaterally. The state does not have to pay employers' contributions to the social insurance funds (about 20 per cent of gross income). However, costs have been shifted into the future, since pensions will eventually have to be paid directly out of annual budgets and civil servants' pension entitlements are higher than those of non-civil servants. Section 4) . The average skill level is higher in the public service than in private industry because many high-and intermediate-level activities, such as education, the courts and revenue collection (tax offices), are concentrated in the public sector. This is reflected in the composition of the workforce, with some differences between civil and non-civil servants. In 2010, most civil servants were employed in the higher, higher-middle and middle service and only very few in the lower service. Since 2002, when these detailed statistics were first compiled, the skill composition has not much changed, with only a slight increase in the higher service being observed. The skill composition of the non-civil servants is somewhat different. The middle and lower service is much more densely populated with non-civil servants than with civil servants (Figure 6.4) . Many of the activities at these levels are subject to outsourcing, which is obviously much easier with employees who do not enjoy guarantees of lifetime employment.
Composition of Public Sector Employment
Civil servants and non-civil servants
It was commonplace for civil servants to be employed on temporary contracts during the preparatory period. Since the mid-1980s, however, the possibilities for recruiting staff on temporary contracts have been extended considerably and those parts of the public sector in which lifetime employees are concentrated have made more intensive use of them than the private sector. The share of temporary employees increased between 2002 and 2010 from 10 to 14.7 per cent, a much sharper increase than in the private sector and a share now far above the average for Gerhard Bosch -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:12:32PM via free access the economy as a whole, which was 8.9 per cent in 2010 (Table 6. 3). Temporary contracts are increasingly being used to cope with shortages without increasing the number of permanent staff and endangering the goals of future staff reductions. The strict limitation of the number of core workers in the public budgets on the basis of a head count, irrespective of working hours, also requires a higher share of temporary contracts in order to make up for the hours lost by voluntary part-time employment.
The share of voluntary notices of termination is very low (0.4 per cent in the public compared to 1.9 per cent in the private sector). Labour turnover in the public sector is much lower than in private industry (6.3 per cent compared to 10.5 per cent in the first half of 2008). Turnover in the public service is highly concentrated among temporary staff (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011: 22) . The high level of employment protection enjoyed by permanent employees and their low voluntary mobility explains why the burden of numerical flexibility has been shifted on to temporary employees. It also helps to explain why temporary contracts in the public sector are more often a trap than a bridge into permanent employment. A lower share of temporary workers in the public sector subsequently obtain a permanent contract than in the private sector (ibid.: 24-5). Source: Destatis (2011a); author's calculations.
Figure 6.4 Number of civil servants and non-civil servants by skill level and share of women, Germany, 2010 (%)
Women in the public service
In the past decade, the number of women employed in the public service has remained virtually constant, while men's employment went down by about 9 per cent. Consequently, women's share increased and, at 53.8 per cent, was about 8 percentage points higher in 2010 than their share in total employment (Table 6 .4). The public sector offers jobs for highly skilled women in particular. The share of such women in the public service, at 43 per cent, was 14 percentage points higher than in the private sector. The share of women in management positions is higher in the public service than in the private sector (29 versus 23 per cent) (Table 6 .5). However, only 14.5 per cent of jobs in the upper echelons of the higher service (civil servants only) are held by women, while in the entry positions of the higher service the share of women is 65.6 per cent (Destatis 2011a: 35) . 
Full-and part-time work
The number of full-timers fell from 5,571 million in 1991 to 3,107 million in 2010. At the same time, the number of part-timers increased from 1,066 million in 1991 to 1,427 million in 2010, which meant that the share of Source: Ellguth and Kohaut (2011: 25) and Destatis (2011a) (total female employment rates). (2, 385, 172) 53.4 (2, 429, 354) 53.8 (2, 467, 162) Total public sector employment as % of all employment 12.3 (4, 809, 090) 11.8 (4, 599, 425) 11.5 (4, 540, 600) 11.3 (4, 547, 586) 11.3 (4, 586, 100) % of women in employment who work in the public sector 15.6 (2, 476, 600) 14.6 (2, 390, 800) 13.8 (2, 385, 200) 13.7 (2, 429, 400) 13.8 (2, 467, 200) Sources: Destatis (2010 Destatis ( , 2011a The expansion of traditional part-time working before retirement took place in the 1970s and 1980s. In accordance with the alimentation principle, civil servants are generally full-time employees. They have, however, the right to work part-time for family reasons as long as they have children under 18 or care responsibilities in the family. They can also ask to work part-time without such reasons. Such a request has to be accepted unless the employer has good reasons to refuse. Voluntary part-time employment should not involve less than 50 per cent of normal working hours. Since part-time work is the result of employees asserting their right to work parttime temporarily with the option to return to full-time work at some stage, it can be assumed that most of the 400,000 civil servants working parttime are doing so voluntarily. The non-civil servants have similar rights, but they may also be working part-time because they were recruited for a part-time job. In the private sector, full-timers have the right under federal law to work part-time, but there is no corresponding right to go back to full-time work.
In the traditional German male breadwinner system, with half-day school and a lack of public childcare, many women opt for part-time work. In 2010, 36 per cent of full-timers and 81 per cent of part-timers in the public service were women (Destatis 2011a ). An analysis based on a panel of companies with employees subject to social insurance contributions (excluding public service companies that employ civil servants only) shows that the public service has a higher share of part-timers (27 per cent) than the private sector (22 per cent). The composition of part-timers also differs. Most part-timers in the public service (24 per cent of the workforce) are insured and only 3 per cent are working in a marginal part-time job, the so-called 'mini-jobs', which are not subject to social insurance contributions (private industry 10 to 12 per cent) (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011: 24) . This reflects the impact of the regulations requiring substantial part-time work involving at least 50 per cent of normal full-time hours.
Two-thirds of the additional part-timers between 2002 and 2010 were older workers who opted to go part-time prior to retirement. This scheme was made attractive because participants received about 85 per cent of their former net income but had to work only 50 per cent of their previous hours. In practice only a few actually worked part-time. The others opted for a so-called 'block model' in which they worked normal full-time hours for the first two and a half years and zero hours for the second two and a half years. Since these part-timers were mostly not replaced in their so-called 'passive phase' and in many cases not after retirement either, this scheme resulted in an intensification of work for the remaining employees and also contributed to the reduction of overall staff numbers. The scheme has now been replaced by a less generous one, with a maximum quota of 2.5 per cent of older part-timers in each organization.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Industry-wide bargaining is still common in the public sector. The highly standardized national agreement, which covered the whole public sector, has been replaced by a multitude of collective agreements. The interests of the actors on both sides have become more heterogeneous, which in turn has led to a decentralization and fragmentation of collective bargaining. Ninety-three per cent of employees in the direct public service are covered by a collective agreement compared to 57 per cent in the private sector. However, there are no areas of the public service without collective agreements as there are in the private sector. In addition, the collective agreements are not being eroded from within as they are in many private companies. Collective agreements are generally complied with by employers. Ninety-three per cent of public sector employees are represented by a works council or its equivalent, the employee council (Personalrat), compared to 40 per cent in the private sector (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011) . The employee councils, together with the unions, monitor and enforce the collective agreements much more effectively than in the private sector. The state is no longer the model employer guaranteeing better working conditions than in the private sector, but it is still a model employer in the sense that it complies with the agreements which its representatives have signed and that it tries to intimidate 'inconvenient' employee representatives only in exceptional circumstances.
Employers' Organizations and Unions
The employers in the public sector are organized differently at local, state and federal levels. At local level there is a strong employers' organization (kommunale Arbeitgeberverbände or KAV For many decades the federal, Land and local employers of the public service had a joint bargaining committee. The common goal was to negotiate a single national collective agreement for the public service. At the end of 2003, the TDL left the joint bargaining committee. The 16 Länder wanted to negotiate working hours and annual bonuses individually. The Länder have the highest shares of wage costs in their budgets, since they are responsible for highly paid public services such as education and research. The share of employee compensation in total expenditures was 36.7 per cent in 2006, compared with 10.1 per cent for the federal state and 25.9 per cent for the municipalities (Keller 2010: 29) . One state (Hesse) even left the TDL in 2005. Another exception is Berlin. It was excluded from collective bargaining in 1994 because it was paying western salaries in the eastern part of the city, contrary to the agreements. Since 2003 Berlin has wanted to become a member of the TDL again.
Compared to the private sector, the unions in the public sector are fragmented. In the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), three unions represent employees in the public service: ver.di (2,071,990 members), 3 the teachers' union (GEW, 263,129 members) and the police union (GDP, 171,709 members). In addition, there is a strong union of civil servants (Deutscher Beamtenbund, DBB) with 1,265,720 members, which also organizes non-civil servants. In the past the DGB unions negotiated jointly and cooperated with the DBB. Today DGB and DBB form a joint negotiating committee which, however, does not include all DBB unions. Train drivers, pilots, doctors and air traffic controllers defected from joint bargaining and negotiated separately. In recent years, they have succeeded in improving their members' pay, in some cases after successful strikes.
Employee Representation
The German dual system of representation also exists in the public service. Collective agreements are negotiated by unions and at the company level employee councils (Personalvertretung) represent all employees. They have strong rights of codetermination and the right to negotiate company agreements in areas not covered by a collective agreement. The employee councils differ from works councils in the private sector. They have fewer rights to information on economic issues than their counterparts in the private sector, since it is argued that this would interfere with the rights of parliaments at the various levels to set their own budgets. The employee councils' rights to consultation and codetermination vary because all 16 Länder have their own employee council laws. The employee councils are strengthened by a high union density, which at 60 per cent is much higher than in the private sector (ibid.: 83).
The position of the employee councils in regulating the internal labour markets is usually very strong, since the workforce is protected against dismissals. The classification of employees is the main area of contention and disputes have often been settled only after many court decisions. The courts have now delivered such detailed judgments that most disputes between the social partners have been resolved. At the company level, however, there is still some interpretative leeway on employee classification. Strong employee representatives are using this leeway to support employees in their requests for promotion and are often successful. Employers can also take advantage of this leeway to recruit specialists from the private sector, which is becoming increasingly difficult. In this way substitutes for wage drift can be created, whether to increase employee motivation or to assist recruitment in a tight labour market.
Collective Bargaining
Until 2003, unions and employers negotiated jointly at national level. The national pattern agreements covered all blue-and white-collar noncivil servants at national, state and local levels. Shortly after the national negotiations, civil servants' pay and working hours used to be adjusted to the level of the new agreement. The main provisions of the national agreements were also adopted by the social partners in public companies (post, railways and so on). Most charity organizations as well as private service providers also followed the agreement. Thus the central public sector agreement served as a pattern agreement even beyond the public service.
Today, collective bargaining in the public sector is more decentralized than in the past. Working hours and pay differ between the federal state, Gerhard Bosch -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:12:32PM via free access the 16 Länder and the municipalities. The 'turning point' in public sector collective bargaining was the negotiations on the new framework agreements that started in 2003. The job descriptions in the old agreements dated back to the early 1960s and contained many jobs which had long ceased to exist (such as keypunching). There were still separate agreements for blueand white-collar workers, while in other industries these status differences had already been abolished. The unions wanted to reduce discrimination by introducing a gender-neutral job evaluation system. They also wanted to simplify the increasingly complex system, with its more than 17,000 job descriptions, and to reduce the incentives for outsourcing. The employers had less clear goals. Their main priority was cost-neutrality. Because of the cost pressures traditional employer goals like the expansion of performance pay became clearly less important. Obviously the different goals were not compatible. Re-evaluation of traditional female jobs conflicted with the goal of cost neutrality. Moreover, both sides were pursuing goals that were themselves contradictory. Reducing wages for unskilled jobs in order to avoid outsourcing was not compatible with the union goal of reducing gender discrimination. The employers were also pursuing contradictory goals. Higher wages for specialists to make the public sector more attractive was in conflict with the employer goal of cost-neutrality. Because of the cost pressures after the tax cuts in early 2000, the negotiations were more pressured than previously and did not end with a new single national agreement. The Länder refused to sign the new framework agreement because they wanted cuts in annual bonuses and longer working hours. The municipalities only continued negotiations under the 'most-favoured-treatment clause', whereby compromises subsequently agreed in the separate negotiations with the Länder would also apply to them. In the end, two slightly different national framework agreements were signed in 2005 by the federal state and the municipalities and in 2006 for the Länder with the exception of Hesse, which had its own agreement.
This 'reform of the century' signified a change in the basic assumptions about the functioning of the labour market in the public sector of the future: mobility between private and public companies should be encouraged by abolishing pay elements that exist only in the public sector, such as seniority pay increases and family allowances. Promotion should be based on efficiency instead of tenure, and performance pay should be extended. Divisive status differences between blue-and white-collar workers should be reduced in order to improve cooperation and team work. Internal flexibility should be improved by working-time flexibility and by temporary and probationary management positions. The public service should be made more attractive by raising starting salaries and reducing promotions. A main driver of the reform, finally, was the intention to simplify a wage Gerhard Bosch -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:12:32PM via free access system that over decades had become increasingly complex and bureaucratic. Losers in the new agreements were to be protected by an acquired rights clause. The most important changes (Table 6 .6) were:
• abolition of the different statuses of blue-and white-collar workers;
• joint pay grid with 15 pay grades with six experience promotions (instead of 12 seniority promotions); • lower starting pay for low-skill workers to avoid or reduce outsourcing; • extension of performance pay; and • abolition of family allowances.
Set alongside these worthy objectives, the actual outcomes were much more modest. The social partners did not succeed in agreeing on new job descriptions. They decoupled these negotiations from the other parts of the collective agreements and extended the validity of the old job descriptions. It took until 2012 before new job descriptions were negotiated which, with 16,500 job descriptions, remained as complex as before. Both sides had obviously underestimated the complexity of public sector jobs.
The negotiations with the Länder proved to be more conflictual (see Appendix 6A: Strikes in the public service), since the employers demanded so-called 'opening clauses' with a view to introducing longer working hours and reductions in the Christmas bonus. Due to the lengthy negotiations there was a transitional period when, for the first time since the Second World War, no valid collective agreement was in force. This meant that existing employees were still protected by the old agreement since collective agreements in Germany remain in force until they are replaced by a new agreement. However, new employees had to work 42 hours per week and their Christmas bonus was lowered. Strike action proved to be not very effective, since strikes by Länder employees, such as school or kindergarten teachers, have fewer direct effects on the economy than strikes by train drivers or refuse collectors. The unions finally signed a new agreement. After the state of Hesse left the employers' organization, they were afraid of further fragmentation and accepted a new collective agreement with opening clauses for working hours and the Christmas bonus. The Länder used these opening clauses and extended working hours from 38.5 hours to between 38.7 and 39.7 hours. The Christmas bonus was substantially cut, whereby the cuts were lower for the middle-and lowerwage groups. The increase in working hours was translated directly into staff reductions. The unions clearly lost the 38.5-hour week, which they had agreed in 1990, and working hours are nearly back to 40 hours. The federal government and the employers' organization of the municipalities (KAV) demanded under reference to the most-favoured-treatment clause an increase of weekly working hours. The unions refused this prolongation of working hours. The administration court of Berlin rejected the claim of the employers, saying that picking out single clauses from a generally different agreement is unlawful. Both framework agreements were supplemented by specific agreements for different occupational groups or subsectors such as hospitals, care, local transport and so on. The specific agreements always have priority over the general agreement. The specific agreement for doctors was negotiated after a long strike by a doctors' union that had left the former joint negotiating committee and achieved higher wage increases for its constituency. Since hospitals are subject to strict cost controls, these wage concessions were partly financed by staff reductions for other occupational groups.
The implementation of the new framework agreements is still ongoing. Surprisingly, model calculations of the impact of the new framework agreement on lifetime income are not available. It seems that neither the unions nor the employers want the long-term effects of the agreement on the incomes of different groups to be known, because this might cause all kinds of conflicts. The increased possibilities for performance pay are not being fully used, partly because the employee councils have blocked them and partly because the employers have not yet developed reliable performance indicators or assessment systems. A survey among employee councillors in North-Rhine Westphalia showed that in 32 per cent of municipalities the new low-wage group was used for newly recruited employees. In most cases it was used for cleaning. About 9 per cent of the employee councillors interviewed answered that the new wage group helped to avoid outsourcing or promoted insourcing (Schmidt et al. 2011: 254) . Some of the employee councillors, however, were afraid of negative secondary effects caused by a general decrease in starting wages as previously well-rewarded activities were reclassified as 'simple'.
Consultation with Civil Servants
As compensation for the lack of a right to strike and negotiate working conditions, there are longstanding institutionalized joint consultation procedures with the unions representing civil servants (ver.di and DBB). The unions have to be consulted on all new laws concerning the status and the working conditions of civil servants. In addition, top-level talks between the ministry of the interior and the unions have to be held twice a year (Keller 2010: 127) . In the past, consultations mainly took place at national level, since civil servants' working conditions were regulated by national legislation. With the reform of the federal system in 2006, responsibility for working conditions was devolved to the Länder. Since then, working conditions, which used to be highly standardized, have become increasingly differentiated. The richer states in the South (Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg) are already offering higher wages to attract teachers and scarce specialists from other Länder. The northern states agreed to coordinate their civil servant pay policy in order to avoid wage increases as a result of mutual overbidding. A comparison of the annual wages of a civil servant in one wage group of the higher service, in which for example many teachers are classified (A 13), shows that annual salaries in Western Germany range between €52,216.81 (Bavaria) and €48,290.75 (West Berlin) and in Eastern Germany between €47,094.00 in Saxony and €44,949.04 in East Berlin. The federal government pays the highest salary at €52,915.49 (Kammradt 2009: 105) .
In the past, improvements in working conditions laid down in new collective agreements were directly transferred to civil servants. This process of harmonizing working conditions went in both directions. Civil servants were granted similar rights to partial retirement or part-time work as non-civil servants and the unions achieved nearly the same job security for non-civil servants, who cannot be dismissed once they have completed 15 years of service. Since early 2000, this quasi-automatic connection between the working conditions of the two groups has evaporated. To save money, employers started to increase the wages of civil servants only after a period of time. They also underlined their demands for concessions with unilateral decisions to increase working hours and reduce the Christmas bonus for civil servants. Civil servants now have working hours between 40 (Berlin, Hamburg), 41 (federal state, North-Rhine Westphalia) and 42 (Bavaria, Thuringia) hours a week. The higher job security of civil servants is used to justify this deterioration in their working conditions compared to non-civil servants.
From a Single Contract to a Plurality of Agreements
Industrial relations still differ substantially between the private and public sectors. Coverage by collective agreements is close to 100 per cent in the public sector, due to strong employee councils and the state's responsibility for ensuring that its own regulations are enforced. The old homogeneous system, with its joint national agreement for the core public sector that served as a pattern agreement for the indirect public sector, for civil servants and for charity organizations, has now been replaced by a fragmented system of competing agreements.
Depending on the parties in power at any one time, there might be some recentralization. Berlin will join the TDL again and the new government in Hesse might follow suit. The dominant trend, however, is towards a gradual differentiation, especially in working hours and annual bonuses, between Länder and municipalities and between civil and non-civil servants. The formerly homogeneous system based on cooperative federalism is being replaced by a new system based on competitive federalism, with increasingly diverging standards. For the unions, the system's running costs have increased substantially. They have had to create new representational structures for civil servants in all 16 Länder and to coordinate the now fragmented collective bargaining. The increasing use of 'opening' or derogation clauses and of performance pay will shift more responsibility on to the employee councils, which in many cases are not yet prepared for such tasks. They will require support from the unions, although their limited resources mean that only partial support will be provided. Research on the use of opening clauses in other industries (engineering and chemical industries) showed that such decentralization also offers opportunities for unions to increase member participation, strengthen shop-floor organization and recruit new members (Lehndorff and Haipeter 2011) .
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PUBLIC SECTOR PAY AND PENSIONS
Pay
In the past decade, collectively agreed pay increases in the public sector fell behind those agreed in most private industries (Figure 6 .5). Because of the tax cuts already mentioned, pressures on pay were very high in the public service. Increases in hourly rates were partly offset by a reduction in annual bonuses or increased working hours. A recent analysis of total labour costs per working hour, which include annual bonuses and employers' contributions, confirm this picture. Total labour costs in the German public sector increased between 2000 and 2010 by only 1.1 per cent per year compared to 1.7 per cent in the German private sector and much higher rates in some other EU countries, such as 4.3 per cent in the United Kingdom, 4.3 per cent in Belgium and 3.3 per cent in the Netherlands (Niechoj et al. 2011: 7) . In 2010, hourly labour costs in the private sector were €29.1, compared to €28.6 in the public sector (Niechoj et al. 2011) . Average pay in the public sector is slightly above that in the private sector for full-time women employees and slightly below for male full-timers. Part-timers of both sexes 2000 are better paid in the public sector (Table 6 .7). The main reason for this is the low proportion of marginal part-timers (mini-jobbers), many of whom in the private sector receive lower rates of pay than other part-timers (Voss and Weinkopf 2012) . However, public sector pay is more compressed than in the private sector. Women and those in intermediate and highly skilled positions are the particular winners in this wage structure. A recent, more detailed analysis of pay in the public and private sectors based on the Socio-Economic Panel compared the distribution of hourly gross and net wages of employees in the public and private sectors in 1995 and 2007 (Tepe and Kroos 2010) . Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the wage differences between public and private sectors for men and women in East and West Germany by percentiles. In West Germany, public sector wages in the lower percentiles are slightly higher than private sector ages for men and substantially higher for women. In the higher percentiles, the difference narrows and eventually becomes negative. In East Germany in spite of lower collectively agreed public sector wages, the positive wage gap for the lower percentiles is greater than in the West. In addition, the wage gap is also positive for the middle and higher incomes, only becoming negative for men in the very high percentiles. Because of the relative decline in private sector wage levels in East Germany, the positive wage gap increased for men and women up to the high percentiles.
For low-skilled workers, the wage gap with the private sector is positive for both men and women (Figures 6.8 and 6.9) . Highly skilled men, however, earn more in the public service only in the low percentiles. For highly skilled women, there was a positive wage gap until the middle percentiles. Note: * Only non-civil servants, non-market services (includes charity organizations).
Source: Destatis (2011c).
Pensions
The status of civil servant (Beamte) is a lifetime status that does not end with the transition from work into retirement. German civil service law Germany, 1995 and 2007 (%) regards retirement only as the end of active service; according to the above-mentioned alimentation principle, the state remains obliged to guarantee an appropriate standard of living even for a retired Beamte. The pension system for civil servants is a one-pillar system with a pension paid level, women, Germany, 1995 and 2007 (%) directly by the state out of its annual budgets without any contributions from civil servants. The pension system for non-civil servants is a two-pillar system. Like all other employees, they pay contributions to the national pension scheme. The second pillar is an occupational pension scheme for the public sector. It was agreed upon in a national collective agreement and is quasi-mandatory because virtually 100 per cent of the non-civil servant workforce is covered by this agreement. The contributions to this scheme amount to 7.86 per cent of monthly gross pay, of which the employers pay 6.54 per cent. The intention was to raise the pensions of non-civil servants to the more generous level of the pensions paid to Beamte.
The pensions of public sector employees are generally higher than those of employees in the private economy because the second pillar is not mandatory in the private sector and civil servants' pensions are substantially more generous than state pensions. In recent years, pension levels in the national pension system have been lowered because of the ageing of the population. The pensions of civil servants have been adapted to these decreases. Now early retirement is possible only with deductions. Between 2003 and 2009, the maximum pension level was gradually reduced from 75 per cent of the former gross income to 71.75 per cent. As early as 1992, it was decided that the maximum level could be reached only after 40 years of service instead of the 35 years previously required (Färber et al. 2011: 101-3) . Because of these changes, actual pension levels decreased from 72.8 per cent of the former gross income in 1994 to 69 per cent in 2011. In subsectors with more turnover and shorter service in the public sector, such as the Post Office, it declined even further, from 72.1 to 65.6 per cent (Destatis 2011b: 81) .
Comparison of the pension levels of former public and private sector employees is difficult since no statistic captures the accumulated effects of the first and second pillars. Table 6 .8 shows that civil servants' pensions are far higher than state pensions. However, they have to be taxed, while pensions from the national pension system are tax free. It can be assumed that the average pensions of non-civil servants in the public sector are higher than private sector pensions, since the second, occupational pension, is mandatory, while only 21 per cent of private sector employees receive an occupational pension. The traditional male breadwinner model, in which women tend to have discontinuous employment histories, is reflected in lower pensions for women in all categories. In the private sector, women are more likely than men to be employed in industries and companies with no occupational pensions. Because of the mandatory second pillar, they are much better off in the public sector.
CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1: Prevailing Wages to Limit Wage Competition in Public Procurement
The German public service is very lean because services have been increasingly outsourced. The value of services and goods, bought by the government in 2009 equated to 12.9 per cent of GDP, compared to 11.4 per cent in 2000. This is 2.8 percentage points above the OECD33 average (10.1 per cent in 2009) (Figure 6 .2). Public procurement offers the state not only efficient allocation of its resources but also the realization of other important goals, such as the promotion of innovation, environmental protection, reduction of CO 2 emissions, equal treatment of men and women or compliance with local labour standards as required by the ILO Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94) . 4 Germany has not ratified this convention. Under European regulations, selection criteria can be extended to include environmental and social criteria (European Union 2004) . The German Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the state's right to introduce prevailing wage laws and underlined the legitimacy of the goals of stabilizing the social security and collective bargaining systems (Schulten and Pawicki 2008: 186) . The introduction of prevailing wages with outsourcing and subcontracting was aimed at setting minimum wage thresholds within the framework of public procurement. In the past, it was not regarded as necessary to include such protection clauses in the public procurement laws. Until the mid-1990s, the state used to be a model employer not only for its own employees but also for workers providing outsourced services, who were paid according to collectively agreed standards. In the past two decades, the state has increasingly become a major driver in the expansion of a low-wage sector as a result of outsourcing and privatization and also as a contracting authority. Increasingly, the more than 30,000 procurement bodies in the public service have awarded contracts on the basis of price alone, although the procurement laws leave it to the procurement body to combine price and quality criteria in order to determine the most advantageous offer. Prevailing wages have emerged in response to these new needs.
Berlin was the first federal state to introduce a prevailing wage law. The SDP-Green coalition's draft legislation on a federal prevailing wage law was never enacted, since it was not passed by the second chamber (the Bundesrat), in which the opposition had a majority. Subsequently, some Länder introduced their own legislation and most others followed suit or plan to do so (Figure 6 .10). In some states, such as North-Rhine Westphalia, the prevailing wage law introduced by the SDP-Green coalition was repealed by the incoming CDU government and re-introduced following the most recent elections. In 2008, the prevailing wage law in Lower Saxony was declared unlawful by the European Court of Justice. 5 Afterwards, some Länder (for example, Hesse) repealed their laws, while others amended them. The laws in the various Länder differ but there are some common trends. The early laws included only the construction industry, then local transport, security services and cleaning were included and now in Bremen all services and in Berlin all public contracts are covered. The sphere of application within the public service also differs. Some states include the municipalities, others only the state itself. Some states include all public contracts, others only those above a defined threshold value (between €10,000 and €50,000). The sanctions for noncompliance also differ. Some states exclude companies that violate the law from participation in tendering for up to three years, some allow cancellation of the contract without notice. The general contractor is always held responsible for complying with the law. In three states, the public procurement body has to agree to the selection of subcontractors. Hamburg set up its own control authority.
The first generation of prevailing wage laws required only compliance with local standards. Since Germany does not have a national minimum wage and these local standards are often very low, the latest legislation combines the prevailing wage laws with minimum wages for public procurement (Figure 6.11) . The level of the minimum wage more or less corresponds to the lowest wage level in the public service in the relevant state (Schulten and Pawicki 2008: 189) . The argument is that the state should not underbid itself.
Not much is known about the implementation and impact of the prevailing wage laws. The two evaluation studies in Hamburg and in NorthRhine Westphalia are based on expert interviews and company surveys (Stefaniak and Vollmer 2005; Hamburger Senat 2007 monitoring by the state. In North-Rhine Westphalia the lack of monitoring was criticized. All German prevailing wage laws were carefully checked to ensure compliance with European law. The experts, however, still see these laws as under threat because of the restrictive decisions of the European Court of Justice.
Case Study 2: Adjustment in the Highly Indebted City of Duisburg and Effects on the Public Service
Many German municipalities are structurally underfinanced. They suffered income losses after the tax cuts in early 2000 while having to increase expenditure on social welfare. The municipalities are formally autonomous and responsible for their budgets. However, the state parliament may impose new duties and obligations on the municipalities without providing any additional funds that may be needed. In spite of considerable efforts to consolidate budgets, deficits have increased over the past decade (Figure 6 .12). These efforts included staff reductions and cuts in investment, which decreased even in nominal terms from €24 billion in 2001 to €23 billion in 2010. The main reason for the budget deficits was increased expenditure on social welfare, up from €27 billion in 2001 to €42 billion euros in 2010. These transfers included expenditures for the newly established childcare facilities for children between 0 and 3 years, 6 housing for the unemployed, welfare payments for older people with no or low pensions, care assistance and youth welfare services. Some of the municipalities hardest hit by budgetary problems are those in West Germany that have seen many jobs lost in declining industries. These municipalities have especially high expenditures on the unemployed and disadvantaged children and young people, and the demand for care services is above average because the share of older people is higher than in expanding cities. At the same time, their revenues are stagnating and in spite of their financial problems they still have to contribute to the socalled 'solidarity pact' (Solidarpakt), through which money is transferred from western to eastern German states, transfers that will continue until 2019. Many of the municipalities with severe budget problems are in the Ruhr area, where heavy industry is concentrated. Most cities in the Ruhr area have budget deficits and their budgets are under the control of the Regierungspräsident (see above). They have to consolidate their budgets, their budgets need the approval of the Regierungspräsident and in principle they are allowed to spend money only as required to fulfil their statutory obligations.
Duisburg is a prime example of an industrial city in western Germany with increasing structural budget problems. Because of extensive job losses and high unemployment rates, revenues increased only slowly at a time when expenditures on social transfers were increasing particularly fast. The city tried to reduce the deficit by cutting investments and staffing levels, but without much success. Since 1992, its debts have been increasing continuously. By 2010, the city's debts were greater than its assets (Kambeck and Rappen 2010: 8) and the deficit had risen to €1.6 billion (Stadt Duisburg 2010: 3) , which corresponds to about 133 per cent of its annual revenues.
The local government code stipulates that a city with negative equity should have surpluses until the equity becomes positive. In 2008 the Regierungspräsident required the city to draw up a consolidation plan. In 2010 the city council decided on a consolidation plan for 2010 to 2013 that would reduce the deficit but not achieve a balanced budget (Figure 6 .13). The city council declared that a balanced budget could be reached only with financial help from the Länder or the federal government (ibid.: 8).
The consolidation plan envisaged, first, increasing revenue by putting up various local taxes and raising fees for most services, including libraries and theatres. Second, non-statutory benefits and services were to be cut. For example, a theatre and some swimming pools were to be closed and subsidies for sport clubs, youth clubs and so on reduced or withdrawn completely. Third, because of the ageing of the population and smaller cohorts of children, schools were to be closed. Fourth, investments would take place only if absolutely needed. Fifth, the city's wage bill was to be reduced. The plan contained 245 individual cost-reduction measures, the most important of which was a planned staff reduction of about 10 per cent (400 employees), to be achieved by 2013. Since the city agreed with the unions not to dismiss employees, the main instrument to be used was turnover with retiring employees not being replaced. In order to control staff reductions, human resource policy is now centralized. The district president has to approve all new recruitments. Promotions are no longer being approved. An internal placement service has been put in place to assist employees in redeployment. Staff reductions through early retirement, voluntary severance or working-time reductions are being actively encouraged. Rationalization measures such as the centralization of purchasing departments should also contribute to reductions in staff requirements. The human resource policy seems to have become so restrictive that a recent evaluation of the city's consolidation plan of the city mandated by the Chamber of Commerce warns that the public service is becoming less attractive. The report also notes that the internal placement service will only work effectively if redeployed employees are not harassed and downgraded and if the promises to promote further training are actually kept (Kambeck and Rappen 2010: 43) .
CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to most other EU countries, employment in the German public sector was not reduced after the financial crisis. The number of public employees and also wages even increased after a long period of staff reductions and wage restraint. Considerable adjustments had taken place in previous decades, however, with substantial cumulative effects (Table 6.9). The main driver of public sector adjustments was tax cuts which caused high budget deficits and obliged the state to shrink. The number of public employees fell by nearly one-third, from 6,738,000 in 1991 to 4,586,000 in 2010. Since the share of part-timers increased from about one-sixth to about one-third of all employees in the same period, the decrease in the volume of paid hours was even higher than in the headcount. Further staff reductions are facilitated by an increase of temporary employees who do not benefit from the high level of employment protection in the public sector.
Today the German public sector is one of the smallest in the OECD. The debt brake, which was amended in the Constitution in 2009, leaves German politicians in the coming decade only the choice between further employment cuts or tax increases. The present strategies of the federal state to shift the financial responsibilities for new services such as childcare and social welfare payments to the municipalities, especially for the longterm unemployed, are not sustainable. Without additional transfers from the federal state, many municipalities will not be able to reduce their debts and the goal fixed in the German Constitution to guarantee equal living conditions in all regions will not be achieved.
The state tried to benefit from expanding the share of low-wage work in the private sector by outsourcing well-paid public sector jobs. To avoid only defensive reactions such as the introduction of new low-pay grades, as in the public sector agreements of 2005, proposals of a proactive re-regulation of the labour market were developed. Besides the introduction of minimum wages in some industries many Länder have introduced prevailing wage laws to take wages out of competition in public procurement by setting minimum wage thresholds. First evaluations show high acceptance by local employers and no negative impacts on costs.
The budget constraints made collective bargaining more difficult for public sector unions. On the union side, small unions organizing professionals with strong bargaining power, such as doctors, train drivers or pilots defected from joint bargaining and negotiated their own better conditions. On the employers' side, the Länder defected from the joint bargaining committee in 2005. The former national single agreement covering all public sector non-civil servant employees was replaced by a multitude of agreements. The two main agreements covering the Länder, on one hand, and the federal state and the municipalities, on the other, however, still cover the majority of the non-civil servant employees. In the past decade pay increases in the public sector were lower than in the private sector. Opening clauses in the collective agreement with the Länder allowed working-time increases and reductions of the Christmas bonus, as well as pay differentiation between the Länder. To finance the wage increases weekly working hours were increased and the Christmas bonus was reduced in all Länder. In addition, wages are increasingly differing between the richer and the poorer Länder. This encourages strategies in the richer states of poaching skilled employees from the poorer Länder. Cooperative federalism is slowly being replaced by competitive federalism, with diverging working conditions. Despite strained industrial relations the unions managed to negotiate a new framework agreement which abolished seniority pay, traditional family allowances and different pay scales between blue-and whitecollar workers. In exchange, the unions had to accept the expansion of performance-related pay and the introduction of low-pay grades to avoid outsourcing into the growing private low-pay sector. First evaluations show that the goal of reducing the complexity of public sector pay was Gerhard Bosch -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:12:32PM via free access not reached. The low-wage grades are partly used to reduce outsourcing of partly sector jobs. To date, performance-related pay has not been used on a large scale because employers seem to have difficulties developing appropriate indicators and human resource strategies. In the past, improvements in the new working conditions of noncivil servants were directly transferred to civil servants. Since 2000 this quasi-automatic connection has disintegrated. Wages of civil servants are increasingly, if at all, adjusted after a time span. In addition, working hours were increased to up to 42 hours a week (Bavaria, Thuringia) and are generally above the level of non-civil servants. The maximum level of the still generous pensions for civil servants has been reduced from 75 to 71.75 per cent of the former gross income between 2003 and 2009. These possibilities for unilateral determination of the working conditions of civil servants might be one reason why most of the workforce reduction since 1991 has fallen upon non-civil servants. Some of these unilateral wage cuts obviously went too far and were declared unlawful by the Federal Court because they violate the alimentation principle which obliges the state to guarantee an adequate living standard. NOTES 5. In the so-called Rueffert case the European Court of Justice ruled that member states may not adopt legislative measures which limit contractors for public works contracts to those undertakings which, within their tender submission, agree to pay their employees at least the rate set by a collective agreement which was not declared as generally binding based on the posted workers' directive (EUROFOUND http://www.eurofound.europa. eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/ruffertcase.htm). 6. Until 2013 all municipalities are obliged to offer public childcare for at least 35 per cent of all children between 0 and 3 years. From 2013 all children above the age of 1 year have entitlements to public childcare.
